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Introduction
The vast bulk of economic activity in the United States is taxed by the federal government. There are
exceptions carved out, primarily for charitable operations, including universities. The rationale is that
these organizations serve the public good and should not be reduced in magnitude by the deleterious
effects of taxes. Universities in particular get a wide range of tax breaks. Contributions to universities are
tax deductible. Earnings from endowments in the form of capital gains, dividends, rents, royalties, or
interest are non-taxable. Property owned by universities is rarely taxed at the local or state level, and uni-
versity fees and often even commercial activities are frequently not subject to sales taxes. Customers of
universities typically get tax breaks, such as tuition tax credits, or are allowed to create tax sheltered sav-
ings accounts to help pay for college.
As university costs have risen, both to student consumers and to
society as a whole, people have started to question historic assumptions
about university activities. People are asking questions like: Should a
person who donates or “buys” a stadium skybox get a tax break for this
non-academic expenditure? Should universities be allowed to amass
huge endowments from tax free gifts and investment income and then
spend only small amounts from the fund, allowing the endowment to
rapidly accrue in a tax free fashion? Should universities be allowed to
spend monies received via tax breaks to provide vast incomes to mem-
bers of the university community, such as multimillion dollar golden
parachutes for presidents and football coaches? Should upper class
individuals be allowed to lower their taxes so their kids can go to
expensive elitist schools that favor alumni children and people with
wealth? Should university endowment funds be allowed to operate without the level of financial report-
ing and transparency required of other businesses that fall under IRS and SEC rules? When universities
use tax-exempt endowment funds or even annual gifts in a matter different than directed by the donor,
should universities be subject to severe criminal or civil penalties for committing fraud?
Should federal tax policy towards universities be reviewed and changed? This study is not a compre-
hensive look at all the issues raised above, but discusses some of the major ones. Special attention is
placed on the tax treatment of university endowments, and what are reasonable rules that should be
enacted, if any, to assure that monies are expended in a manner consistent with the granting of tax-
exempt status. Lesser attention is placed on other issues, such as the use of tuition tax credits.
Why Should Universities Receive Favorable Tax Treatment?
Used car dealers pay taxes to state, local, and federal governments, while universities, generally speaking,
pay taxes to none of these entities. Why the difference? Why do we tax most business enterprises, but we
actually directly or indirectly subsidize higher education?
I can think of at least two lines of reasoning why favorable tax treatment might be justified: Universi-
ties can promote equal economic opportunity, high levels of intergenerational income mobility, and the
American egalitarian ideal that “all men are created equal.” Secondly, it might be argued that universities
have several types of positive spillover effects, which economists call “positive externalities.” Where posi-
tive externalities exist, economic theory suggests there will be under-consumption of the relevant good
or service in the absence of external incentives, such as tax breaks or governmental financial grants.
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The egalitarian argument for favorable tax treatment focuses on the teaching/instructional compo-
nent of higher education. College graduates earn a great deal more, on average, than those without a col-
lege degree. It is difficult to succeed economically without a college education. Yet college education is
costly: high (and rapidly rising) tuition charges have to be paid, plus there is the loss of several years of
work-related income while completing a degree. Affluent people can afford these costs more than the
poor and disadvantaged. In the absence of third party assistance (either public or through private char-
ity), the ability of lower income families to move up the economic ladder over the generations is impeded
by the cost barrier imposed—a barrier that is relatively less consequential for the affluent. In the absence
of governmental intervention, it is argued that intergenerational income mobility will suffer, and poor
but talented persons may be thwarted from realizing their potential—to the detriment of themselves,
America’s egalitarian tradition, and the nation as a whole.
Moreover, it is argued that colleges impart benefits even to individu-
als who are not direct participants in the university experience. For
example, universities allegedly make their students into more informed
citizens, and their graduates are more likely to make intelligent choices
in selecting persons for elective office, being able to discern those indi-
viduals who have substance and integrity as opposed to shallow dema-
gogues with dubious ethical characteristics. As part of their general
education component, universities allegedly teach materials that tend to
bind us together as peoples—our history, the workings of our civic insti-
tutions, etc. University graduates also exhibit less anti-social behavior—
they commit fewer crimes, for example. They are less likely to be a
burden on the community because of unemployment or low incomes. They pay more in taxes than they
take in the form of benefits from the government. They even smoke less—subjecting non-college gradu-
ates less to the effects of secondhand smoke.1
Similarly, it is argued that university sponsored research can have positive externalities as well. A uni-
versity-invented vaccine that protects persons from communicable diseases benefits society—even per-
sons who do not choose to get the vaccine (since their chances of contracting the disease fall as others
gain protection). Some would argue that research can foster economic growth, which benefits everyone,
not just those doing or using the research directly. Studies show that a majority of economic growth does
not come from increasing the raw ingredients of growth—especially capital—so much as it comes from
improving how we use those ingredients—through technology and scientific progress, much of it fos-
tered within universities.2
Are the Egalitarian/Externality Arguments Valid?
For all the vast resources universities devote to researching the most esoteric things, they spend little 
or nothing on objective research into validating or refuting the standard arguments for universities. Are
universities agents for greater equality and income mobility? Do universities have all sorts of positive
externalities as advocated by proponents of higher education, who accordingly argue that universities
should be viewed primarily as public, not private goods, largely publicly financed?
Do Universities Promote or Hinder Income Inequality?
The egalitarian arguments for colleges have problems. It is even possible that making college more acces-
sible for large numbers serves to raise rather than lower income inequality. The great move to making 
Federal Tax Policy Regarding Universities
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college education available for all has come in the sixty years since World War II, yet measured income
inequality has actually grown at the same time that college participation has risen.3 That does not prove
causation, but it certainly reduces the likelihood that increased college access has been a major positive
force for greater equal economic opportunity.
Two factors reduce the extent to which colleges have provided a path to affluence for able younger per-
sons from modest economic circumstances. First, the college attrition rate is extremely high—over 40
percent of students fail to graduate within six years, so for many individuals college access does not trans-
late into the acquisition of high levels of skills leading to high paying jobs.4 Second, many of the ostensi-
bly better colleges whose graduates presumably garner most of the best and highest paying jobs have
severely restricted supply, not increasing numbers of relatively poor students admitted even as demand
has risen.
The better schools that are presumed to be gatekeepers to the best jobs for young college graduates
show a decided preference for students from prosperous families. As figure 1 shows, students attending
the wealthiest schools, as determined by endowment per student in the 105 highest endowment institu-
tions, have a lower proportion of Pell Grant recipients (relatively lower income students) in the popula-
tion than those attending other, less prosperous universities. Within higher education, there seem to be
the equivalent of gated communities that are occupied largely by children from affluent families.
This is illustrated by a study reported by the National Center for Education Statistics which looked at
1992 high school seniors of high mathematical ability. By 2000, 74 percent of those students from fami-
lies with “high socioeconomic status” had acquired at least a bachelor’s degree, compared with just 29
percent of those of low socioeconomic status.5 The proportion of students receiving Pell Grants (denot-
ing lower income students) is actually very low at many major state universities ostensibly founded to
serve the masses of citizenry, including the University of Virginia, founded by Thomas Jefferson.6 As one
observer puts it, we are heavily subsidizing “educational gated communities.”7
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FIGURE 1
STUDENTS WITH PELL GRANTS BY ENDOWMENT PER STUDENT
Source: www.economicdiversity.com.
Indeed, given the seeming abandonment of the goal of equal educational opportunities by many insti-
tutions of higher education, a fairly good case can be made that universities today serve to perpetuate
income inequalities over generations. The perceived best schools give preferences to their own alumni,
children of wealthy persons willing to make large gifts, and others in privileged positions.8 Some
observers have noted that intergenerational income mobility in the United States today is less than in
some other nations, and probably less than it used to be before universities were as important in Ameri-
can life.9 While it is my view that income mobility is still relatively high and probably roughly constant
over time, it is probably also true that the growing universality of higher education in the United States
has not been accompanied by either reduced inequality in static measures of the size distribution of
income, or by indications of greatly enhanced income mobility over time.
There is also considerable evidence that there is growing inequality within the university community.
The gap between the elite private institutions and typical public schools has widened by almost any mea-
sure: average expenditures per student, salaries of professors, average SAT scores of students, etc.10 Grow-
ing institutional inequality appears to also be tied to the “gated community” effect discussed above. The
average percent of students receiving Pell Grants at the ten highest per student endowment institutions
is eleven, for example, compared with 25 percent at the ten lowest endowment schools in the sample of
105 schools that my associate Thomas Ruchti gathered for the 1999–2006 time period.
Moreover, Ruchti found that endowment inequality, even with this sample confined to relatively pros-
perous schools, grew consistently over time, with a Gini coefficient rising from about .52 in 1999 to about
.57 in 2006—already huge endowment differentials expanded significantly over time.11 As figure 2 shows,
the Gini rose in every single year except 2000–2001.
Part of the reason relates to the fact that larger endowment schools earned higher rates of return on
investment income.12 The rewards from risk taking are enhanced by the tax-exempt nature of endow-
ment incomes. Since poorer schools have a stronger need for endowment funds to finance operating
Federal Tax Policy Regarding Universities
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FIGURE 2
ENDOWMENT GINI COEFFICIENTS FOR TOP 105 SCHOOLS
Source: National Association of College and University Business Officers (NACUBO).
expenses, they may feel compelled to follow less risky endowment strategies, increasing the probability
that certain minimal endowment revenues will be available in the short run, but reducing the longer run
rate of return on investment. The fact that the rich schools are more elitist and less open to poorer Amer-
icans extenuates the impression that colleges are far less agents for promoting income equality or mobil-
ity than colleges would like to have us believe.
Positive or Negative Externalities?
Do universities have the positive spillover effects that they often so confidently assert exist? That question
is particularly difficult to answer, since positive and negative externalities are notoriously difficult to
measure, and, indeed, what may be a positive externality to one person is a negative one to another.13 Still,
many of the claims of positive spillover effects appear to be on a somewhat shaky foundation. This is
revealed in the annual Education Pays publication of the College Board.14 There are page after page of
tables that show college graduates smoke less, commit fewer crimes, are less likely to be unemployed, pay
higher taxes, volunteer more, etc. Yet showing association is not the same thing as showing causation. I
would hypothesize that at age eighteen, before entering college, the college bound students tend to have
positive social attributes relative to the high school graduates who do not continue on—they probably
already smoke less, work harder, are more disciplined, volunteer more, commit fewer crimes, etc. What is
the amount that college adds to these positive attributes or reduces negative ones? On that note, we have
little in the way of tangible empirical evidence. The claim of significant positive externalities may hold,
but the evidence is far from clear on that point.
Moreover, some indirect empirical evidence makes claims of wide-
spread positive externalities less compelling. If higher education
improves the quality of life of communities, we would expect to see in-
migration into higher-education-intensive communities or states—areas
that spend a lot on higher education, or that have a lot of college gradu-
ates. Yet statistical examination of the migration/higher education rela-
tionship does not show strong, unambiguous evidence that people want
to move into university-intensive areas to share in the positive spillover
effects—indeed, there is some evidence almost saying the opposite—
implying universities might have negative spillover effects.15
This author knows of little empirical evidence that specifically
addresses the issue of research externalities, but it is striking, given the
amount of subsidization of that activity, that the academic community
has not demonstrated that the spillover effects are sizable. Is this
because the evidence does not support that perspective, one that is clearly in the self-interest of the aca-
demic community to promote? The lack of widespread empirical evidence is particularly suspect given
the fact that there is some evidence that faculty salaries are positively correlated, other things equal, with
the magnitude of federal research grants.
To be sure, the evidence is not all one-sided. There is some evidence, for example, that the presence of
college-educated workers raises the productivity of non-college educated employees, suggesting definite
positive externalities. The point is, however, that the assumption of positive externalities that underlies
federal (and, for that matter, state and local) tax policy is far from being clearly established empirically.
The existing empirical evidence is contradictory. In the face of a situation where some evidence points to
positive externalities, while other evidence points to negative externalities, one could argue that the net
Richard Vedder
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externalities of colleges are a wash and are close to zero. In that case, from an externality perspective, the
evidence would support taxing universities like other business enterprises—neither more (justified if
negative externalities are present) nor less (justified if positive externalities exist).
In short, the current federal tax policy of unambiguously favoring institutions of higher education
from a tax and subsidy perspective seems hard to justify given the fact that the evidence strongly confirms
neither the egalitarian nor the externality arguments are in favor of it. A review of tax policies towards
universities, then, seems justified from the standpoint of maximizing the allocation of resources. That
review should also start with the question: are the current tax breaks justified? Could society be better off
if the tax preferences were removed and the resulting income used for other purposes, either within or
outside of higher education?
Federal Tax and Subsidy Policies Concerning Universities
With the important exception of for-profit institutions, colleges and universities do not pay federal taxes.
It is interesting that the for-profit institutions often pay tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars in
federal taxes while competing non-profit institutions performing similar instructional services and
sometimes offering similar degrees pay nothing. Figure 3 demonstrates this with respect to the largest 
for-profit provider, Apollo Corporation (the University of Phoenix). Not only does the company pay a
lot of taxes, but the amounts have risen substantially over time, just as the not-for-profit competition has
had an increase in subsidies. This creates an un-level playing field, treating providers of higher educa-
tional services in different ways that are hard to justify. Why is it that the University of Phoenix, which
pays taxes, does not receive similar treatment?
Federal Tax Policy Regarding Universities
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FIGURE 3
APOLLO GROUP: YEARLY PROVISION FOR TAXES
Source: The Apollo Group.
What are the tax breaks received by most institutions of higher education? First, they pay no federal
income taxes on the earnings from their invested funds, or on any accumulation of cash reserves arising
from running budget surpluses.16 This includes taxes on cash received from investments (e.g., rents, div-
idends, interest payments), or on realized capital gains. Second, new donations to universities by third
parties are not taxable. This increases the quantity of new gifts to institutions beyond what otherwise
would occur.
The value of these tax breaks is not trivial. Take university endow-
ments. It is probably true that higher educational endowments funds
in mid-2007 aggregated to about $400 billion.17 Assuming an annual
total rate of return on those funds of 10 percent, annual investment
earnings approximate $40 billion. Some of those gains are non-realized
capital gains that even for individuals and for-profit corporations are
taxable only when the gains are realized. Yet some endowment gains
reflect short term capital gains that for others are not only taxable, but
at relatively high rates. Some capital gains from previous years are real-
ized currently even though earned in the past.
It is probably not far out of line to assume that if current endow-
ment income were taxable, universities would pay an average marginal
tax rate on that income of at least 15 percent. Assuming a $40 billion
annual investment income, that means universities receive about $6
billion in annual tax breaks from not taxing endowments. Suppose that
it were decided to tax those endowments but to earmark the proceeds
to promote access among lower income students by expanding the Pell Grant program. Given recent
funding levels, that would allow a Pell Grant expansion in dollar terms of about 40 percent. Moreover,
the financial burden on this change would fall largely on the wealthiest universities that, by and large,
have relatively small Pell Grant populations—the gated communities of higher education. The egalitar-
ian goals of higher education would be served by enhancing Pell Grants, with schools like Harvard, Yale,
and Princeton (which alone have nearly 20 percent of total university endowments) funding greater aid
which would flow in part to schools that do not restrict access severely for lower income Americans. I am
not necessarily advocating such a policy change, and indeed can build a good argument against it, but I
am merely using this illustration to show that the potential impacts on college access of changing federal
tax laws can be important and substantial.
Endowments: Should There Be Federal Spending Requirements?
Some political figures and commentators on higher education issues have advocated imposing minimum
spending requirements from endowment funds in order to qualify for federal tax exemption.18 Why
should outsiders interfere in the spending policies of universities? The argument for doing so can be
made by using an admittedly extreme example. Suppose a university received vast amounts of new
endowment gifts, spurred on by the tax benefits that such gifts confer on the donor. Suppose it decided
to spend nothing from the endowment and simply reinvest all funds for the future. In this case, in the
time period of the gift, there are no observable improvements in how the university performed in its mis-
sions as a consequence of the gift, but the individual donor receives a tax break not given for most other
forms of expenditure. The purpose of the tax exemption is to fulfill the mission of the university, but the
Richard Vedder
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institution, at least in the short run, is doing nothing with the funds that would help it achieve that mis-
sion. Many persons would say in such a case the award of the tax exemption was unjustified. The govern-
ment permits gifts to be made in a tax-exempt manner under the assumption that funds are going to be
used to further the institution’s goals, which presumably have some social benefits to society beyond the
private benefits derived by customers (e.g., students) of the institution.
As table 1 shows, endowment growth has dramatically outdistanced inflation at the large endowment
schools. The table takes the fourteen schools that in 1991 had an endowment valued at over $1 billion in
terms of 2007 purchasing power, and compares that with the actual endowment value in 2006. Note the
huge growth in endowments at every school—at least a doubling allowing for inflation. Indeed, for the
fourteen schools collectively, endowments more than tripled in real terms, growing at an annual com-
pounded inflation-adjusted rate of 8.55 percent per year. Since most colleges and universities have strict
limits on enrollments, even adjusting for enrollment growth, many of these institutions saw a doubling
in inflation-adjusted wealth per student. With this massive growth, why couldn’t colleges accelerate their
spending growth from endowments? If endowments are trivial relative to overall financial needs, then
even large endowment growth would have little overall impact. And certainly that is the case for most
public universities. However, there are a large number of trendsetting prestigious private schools that had
both vast tuition increases in real terms and massive increases in real endowment wealth per student, sug-
gesting that endowment wealth probably has not been seriously used to contain costs to students. Rather
than using endowment to substitute for tuition increases, the schools have simply accelerated institu-
tional spending and/or the growth in the endowment itself.
TABLE 1
ENDOWMENT GROWTH, 14 HIGH ENDOWMENT SCHOOLS, 1991–2006
Institution 1991 Endowmenta 2006 Endowmenta % Growth
Harvard $7,213.6 $29,545.7 309.6%
Yale 3,969.2 18,423.5 364.2
Stanford 3,489.7 14,391.6 312.4
Texas 4,680.1 13,523.2 189.0
Princeton 3,538.4 13,329.1 276.7
MIT 2,210.0 8,550.4 286.9
Columbia 2,439.5 6,067.2 148.7
Emory 2,058.5 4,976.1 141.7
Pennsylvania 1,267.6 5,429.0 328.3
Wash. U.-St.Louis 2,245.6 4,786.8 113.2
Northwestern 1,558.5 5,252.7 237.0
Chicago 1,584.9 4,973.0 213.8
Cornell 1,076.7 4,415.4 310.1
Rice 1,733.4 4,073.5 135.0
All 14 Above 39,065.7 137,737.2 252.6
Notes: a) Numbers in millions of dollars adjusted for inflation by the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers, and
expressed in 2007 dollars.
Source: National Association of College and University Business Officers (NACUBO), National Center for Educational Statistics.
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These are not a few atypical universities of minor importance. Col-
lectively, they hold over one-third of all endowment wealth for U.S.
institutions. Moreover, the table may actually understate growth. For
one thing, if the analysis were extended to 2007, the growth rates would
have been even higher, since endowment growth at schools like Har-
vard and Yale were actually in the double digits for 2005 to 2007, even
after adjusting for inflation. The criteria for selection was based on
1991 endowment size, rather than 2006 endowment size, which biased
findings towards the inclusions of some moderately slow growing
schools in terms of endowment.
The size of endowment needs to be related to the size of the student
body to ascertain resources available per student. To be sure, some endowment funds are used to promote
non-instructional functions—finance research activities, pay for the football coach, etc. Nonetheless,
other things equal, we would expect the potentialities for endowments to relieve student costs varies very
strongly with enrollment, so the more relevant statistic is the available endowment per student. As table
2 shows, using this criteria, many of our nation’s best endowed schools are liberal arts colleges.
It appears that universities have, on average, been reducing their spending from endowment principal
over time.19As figure 4 indicates, spending today is about one-third less per endowment dollar than it was
a generation ago. This is despite the fact that there has not been a corresponding decline in the rate of return
on investment income (including capital gains); indeed, if anything, the opposite appears to be the case.20
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AVERAGE SPENDING FROM ENDOWMENTS, 1982–2006  
Source: Wall Street Journal.
Indeed, for the fourteen schools
collectively, endowments more
than tripled in real terms, grow-
ing at an annual compounded
inflation-adjusted rate of 8.55
percent per year.
How much should universities spend out of their endowment? It
seems to me that a good rule of thumb would be for universities to spend
that amount consistent with the endowment maintaining its real value,
or, more arguably, its real capacity to fund activities at the current 
inflation-adjusted level. Of course, with the passage of time new endow-
ment inflows through new charitable contributions would continue to
increase real spending and the inflation-adjusted size of the endowment
principal. If universities spent more than that indicated above, they
would be reducing the effective purchasing power of the remaining
endowment, and jeopardizing the institution’s mission by potentially
forcing some future reduction in real expenditure. If the institution
spends less than that amount, it is using the endowment to expand the
principal. While there is nothing inherently evil about this, it means that
incremental endowment spending associated with each dollar of tax rev-
enues foregone (because of the tax breaks associated with giving) are quite small in the short run. Tax-
payers, who suffer from the erosion of the tax base associated with tax exemptions and deductions, will
see little in the way of benefit for the “tax expenditure” associated with charitable giving now, although
in theory this should be corrected in the long run. It is this concern that has led to statutory requirements
that non-university private foundations seeking tax exemptions spend 5 percent of the principal amount
of endowments each year.
TABLE 2
15 SCHOOLS WITH OVER $500,000 ENDOWMENT PER STUDENT, 2005a
Institution Endow/Student 3.5% Yieldb 4.6% Yieldb 6% Yieldb
Princeton $1,763,539 $61,724 $81,123 $105,812
Yale 1,439,114 50,369 66,199 86,347
Harvard 1,409,498 49,332 64,837 84,570
Stanford 1,001,208 35,042 46,056 60,072
Grinnell 958,675 33,554 44,100 57,522
Pomona 902,899 31,601 41,533 54,174
Swarthmore 842,882 29,501 38,772 50,573
Rice 773,709 27,080 35,591 46,423
Amherst 763,398 26,719 35,116 45,804
MIT 719,214 25,172 33,084 43,153
Williams 697,313 24,406 32,076 41,839
Cal Tech 696,793 24,387 32,052 41,806
Wellesley 613,502 21,473 28,221 36,810
Berea 600,667 21,023 27,631 36,040
Dartmouth 513,222 17,963 23,608 30,793
Notes: a) Expressed in 2007 dollars. b) Investment income per student for fiscal year 2006.
Source: National Association of College and University Business Officers, National Center of Education Statistics, author’s calculations.
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The 5 percent rule was devised because it was thought that a 5 percent payout is roughly consistent
with maintaining an inflation-adjusted endowment corpus—not effectively dipping into endowment
principal. A decent case can be made that that figure is inappropriate, probably significantly too low in
most cases. For larger endowments, the longer term (ten year) annual rate of return on endowment funds
typically exceeds 10 percent, or perhaps 7 percent after allowing for inflation. A 5 percent spending rule
seems extremely conservative. NACUBO data indicates typical spending from endowment principal is
around 4.2 percent a year presently, somewhat lower than the payout required under a 5 percent rule.
Without a doubt, most American universities have effectively used some of their endowment funds over the
past decade to increase the principal amount of the endowment rather than to meet current university oper-
ating or capital needs. Whether this was done by accident or design is a matter of conjecture—it may well
be the actual rate of return of investments consistently exceeded the rate planned and assumed by uni-
versity financial planners.
Alternatives to a 5 Percent Rule
I am not certain whether a minimum endowment payout rule makes
good public policy sense and feel that its impact on colleges may be less
and of a different nature than advocated by proponents. Nonetheless,
if a rule is going to be adopted, alternative approaches deserve consid-
eration. One idea would be to tailor the minimum required payout rule
(to maintain tax-exempt status) to the past investment experience of the
relevant institution. Institutions that have had a poor record with their
investments—say a long run rate of return before inflation adjust-
ments of just 7 percent—should not be expected to spend as much as
an institution with an extraordinary high return—say 15 percent. One
possible rule would be to make endowments spend an amount equal to
the ten year average compounded rate of return on investments minus the
rate of inflation as determined by the Consumer Prince Index minus an
additional 1 percentage point. Thus if a university had an 11 percent
long run rate of return on investments during a period of 3.5 percent
annual price inflation, the minimum spending requirement would be 6.5 percent (11 minus 3.5, minus
another 1). The additional 1 percentage point partially allows for the lamentable fact that university
spending inflation exceeds the general inflation rate. Universities would argue for a bigger number for
this factor (say 3 percent), but that would be enshrining and validating in public policy the inefficiencies
manifested in rapid increases in university spending per student. The 1 percent extra adjustment is a
compromise between those who reject the concept of any special college differential and those who
would favor a large special adjustment factor.
Table 3 looks at endowments at ten wealthy private schools over a very long period. It shows clearly
that there are huge variations between schools in growth in endowment, at least partly a consequence of
varying investment experience. For example, the University of Rochester was a wealthy school early in the
period on the basis of huge holdings of stock in Eastman Kodak and Xerox. The decline in the relative
fortunes of those companies had a severely adverse impact on Rochester. In the reverse direction, the high
technology boom in Silicon Valley, near Stanford University, helps explain that institution’s rapid endow-
ment growth. All of this increases the argument for tailoring any endowment spending rule to the insti-
tution’s own situation.
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TABLE 3
ENDOWMENT GROWTH AMONG TOP INSTITUTIONS, 1958–2006a
Institution 1958 1980 2006 % increase
Harvard $3,891,564 $4,027,123 $29,952,767 670%
Yale 1,896,608 1,718,923 18,677,267 885
Chicago 1,234,168 871,960 5,041,558 308
MIT 1,048,107 1,084,178 8,668,186 727
Northwestern 1,043,940 775,268 5,325,038 410
Rochester 998,744 956,234 1,544,760 55
Princeton 978,681 1,392,073 13,512,755 1281
Cornell 790,171 644,898 4,476,179 466
Stanford 681,233 1,605,623 14,589,822 2042
Johns Hopkins 676,172 601,071 2,435,059 260
Note: a) Numbers in thousands of dollars adjusted for inflation by the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers, and
expressed in 2007 dollars.
Source: National Association of College and University Business Officers (NACUBO) and World Almanac.
The data also show the problems with a rigid (say 5 percent) spending rule for all schools. In the 1958
to 1980 period, real per student endowments were not rising at a number of schools, even with those
schools spending well under 5 percent of endowment principal. In part, this is because equity markets
were stagnant in this highly inflationary period, and also because colleges followed much more conser-
vative investment strategies than at present. A 5 percent rule in a period similar to 1958–1980 would have
led to real endowment declines at many American institutions.
There are a number of technical issues that any such approach would have to deal with. A detailed dis-
cussion is beyond the scope of this paper, but one issue is: how does one define endowment funds? If the
ratio of operating funds to endowment nationally is similar to that prevailing at Harvard, there probably
are close to $60 billion of university funds residing in non-endowment investment accounts.21 Should
there be limits (say equal to 50 percent of annual expenditures) on non-endowment invested funds not
subject to the spending rule? There are issues about the time period used in formulating any endowment
rule. Any endowment rule based on only a short period of investment experience (say one to three years)
very possibly could significantly misjudge the typical or normal investment experience of the institution,
and could open institutions up to abrupt changes in spending. On the other hand, any extremely long
period of investment experience, say forty years, could lead to modern spending requirements dictated
by investment experiences that are far from representative of those existing at the current time. It would
seem to me a ten year time period might be about right, minimizing somewhat both of these problems,
although not eliminating them. The rate of return on endowment used for tax and rule making purposes
would equal the average annual rate of return over the past decade.
Still another alternative approach would not be to overtly prohibit spending below certain threshold
levels, but to impose a tax on it (sort of an un-consumption tax, since it would apply only if universities
did not adequately spend from their endowments). The goal would be to tax endowment accumulation
in enrollment and inflation-adjusted terms that arise from saving and reinvesting from endowment
income. The principle would be that 100 percent endowment income after adjusting for inflation and
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enrollment growth should be spent on furthering the institutional mission consistent with donor intent.
Some fraction of any real, inflation and enrollment adjusted principal accumulation arising from under
spending of endowment should be taxed, as tax exemptions are granted for university giving on the
assumption it will lead to spending to improve higher education services in the current time period.
The “under spending tax” approach has an advantage in that it is not a new rigid mandate on colleges.
It merely says that tax exemptions for college endowments have limits. Ideally, the under spending tax’s
basis would be determined by each individual institution’s own investment behavior, although that does
pose some administrative costs and loss of simplicity relative to a tax triggered by spending below a com-
mon percent of endowment, say 5 or 6 percent.
Colleges and universities argue for using the Higher Education Price
Index as a measure of inflation. This is totally inappropriate in my
judgment. Indeed, federal legislation should prohibit its use in federal
statistical calculations of “real” changes in college costs. This index,
which is not even compiled by the federal government like other
indices such as the Consumer Price Index, Producer Price Index, or
GDP Price Deflator, is largely determined by input prices in higher
education. If administrative salaries rise, then the Higher Education
Price Index rises. Colleges can give their employees huge salary increases, claim that “higher education
costs are soaring,” and demand larger government subsidies, etc., as a consequence. This price index adds
to the “academic arms race” that is contributing to rising costs of higher educations. In terms of some of
the endowment spending rules discussed above, the use of the Higher Education Price Index would lead
to a lower spending requirement, at least if trends of the past two decades are maintained in the future.
There are other real technical problems with any college cost index, particularly arising from the lack of
good measures of output or performance.
Other Endowment Issues
Some proposals for an endowment spending rule would apply only to colleges with large endowments,
say $500 million. This would reduce the scope of regulation and target the wealthiest of schools. A good
case can be made, however, that perhaps any rule should be based on endowment per student. A small
school with a $300 million endowment is better off than a huge school with a $600 million endowment.
If the goal is to force relatively high levels of spending among the schools that have the most resources
compared with the size of their educational mission, the endowment spending rule should be on a per
student basis.
Some individuals have expressed a desire to mandate how increased endowment spending (dictated
by a federal spending rule) should be allocated. There are a number of difficulties with such an approach.
There is the fact that much endowment money is spent according to the wishes of donors, and if spend-
ing is to be increased because of federal tax policy, in some instances, a strong case could be made that
spending should be increased proportionate with the wishes of institutional donors. Suppose university
A is spending only 4 percent a year out of $3 million given by donor A, or $120,000 a year. Suppose uni-
versity A is forced to increase spending to 6 percent a year under federal regulations. It seems that would
require spending increases from donor A’s funds to $180,000 a year, and it would be inappropriate for the
federal government to mandate how those incremental funds ($60,000 in this case) would be spent. To
do so would be to effectively impose a somewhat capricious tax on those donations and possibly lead to
actions highly inconsistent with donor wishes.
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Those wanting incremental endowment spending to meet instructional or research needs could
achieve their objective by restricting tax-exempt donations and investment income to those areas. It
strikes me as odd that if I die and leave $5 million to Northwestern University (my alma mater) to build
luxury skyboxes for the stadium or to help construct a luxury dormitory for that institution’s mostly
affluent students, I can reduce federal estate taxes by $2 million or more, but if I leave that money to my
kids, I have to pay that huge amount in taxes. Perhaps contributions for some functions should not be
tax-exempt. Examples might include:
• intercollegiate athletic facilities and, more arguably, scholarships
• student union buildings, recreational centers, etc.
• dormitories and eating facilities
• commercial enterprises operated by universities
• other activities not directly tied to the instructional or research mission
Universities raise a more fundamental objection to endowment spending regulation with respect to
earmarked endowment funds. Suppose an endowment is created to give a scholarship to a student grad-
uating from Washington High School. Yet in some years there is no good candidate for the scholarship,
and prudence dictates the money should not be spent, but rather the principal be enhanced, giving the
award out when an able candidate is identified. A rigid rule dictating a minimum spending requirement
would lead to suboptimal use of monies such as this, or so it is argued.
While it is a legitimate issue to consider, I believe the problem is
somewhat overstated. Universities have hundreds, often thousands, of
endowment accounts, and any spending rule would apply not to individ-
ual accounts but to the aggregate university endowment (however, note
the point above about meeting donor intent). Moreover, almost every
endowment has a fair amount of unrestricted funds. If spending from
the account for the scholarship for Washington High is zero this year,
perhaps the spending from another account could appropriately exceed
the statutory minimum rate (maybe because there are multiple good
applicants for a scholarship), and, if necessary, some above statutory
limit spending from some unrestricted accounts (perhaps to pay for
some one-time equipment or software needs) can occur to assure the
institution achieves the institutionally required minimum spending in a
way that is fiscally prudent and meets the intent of donors.
As the data in table 2 indicate, it is true that there are a number of prestigious institutions with huge
endowments per student. The vast increase in endowments over the past couple of years suggests that, if
anything, table 2 understates the potential increase in institutional operating income from enhanced
spending out of endowments. In my reading of investment reports from Harvard University I found that
it spends about 3.5 percent or so annually from its endowment, although its own reporting shows a
somewhat higher level (although below 5 percent). Suppose it increased spending to 6 percent—still
quite conservative. Spending per student would rise by $35,238 under my calculations. My guess is the
net (after scholarships) tuition, room and board charges paid by students is lower than that figure, includ-
ing not only those attending Harvard College but those at all of the graduate and professional schools.
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Harvard has the means to eliminate all tuition, room and board charges for its students without dissipating
its endowment. Recent initiatives to lower the net tuition rate for many students, while welcome, are 
modest in relation to the potential indicated by the endowment’s size. Again, however, there are very 
good arguments suggesting wealthy students should be paying part of their education.
Therefore, I am not suggesting that students getting an MBA from
Harvard should pay no charges, particularly since such a degree typically
provides a high payoff to those pursuing it. But, at the very minimum,
tuition and fees should be eliminated at Harvard College (which com-
prises less than 40 percent the university’s total enrollment) for students
from even moderately prosperous families. One suggested approach for
the super rich schools like Princeton, Yale, and Harvard: eliminate tuition
for families making less than two times the total average tuition, room
and board charge—if that is $45,000 a year, then eliminate all charges for
students from families with under $90,000 annual income. Have a partial
tuition remission for those making between two and six times the typical tuition, room, and board
charge—$270,000 a year in this case (care has to be taken to avoid near confiscatory “taxes” on increment
income approaching 100 percent.). In the example here, tuition, room and board charges would equal 25
percent of income over $90,000 until the maximum rate is reached at $270,000 income. Rich kids (say
from families with incomes of $300,000 a year or more) likely would still pay sticker prices (unless given
a merit based scholarship). Such a scheme would be very consistent with a 5 percent spending rate for
Harvard and several other wealthy institutions, and make these elite schools more clearly affordable to
the middle class without forcing huge amounts of borrowing. Harvard’s recently announced revised pric-
ing system is similar to that proposed here—indeed, for some income groups (say families making
$150,000 to $180,000 a year) even more generous than proposed above, while for other groups it is some-
what less generous (those making from $60,000 to $150,000 a year, or $180,000).
Wealthy colleges who say, “we cannot do that—we cannot make college free or relatively low cost for
all but the super rich” are simply not being truthful. An honest response would be “we have higher pri-
orities than reducing college costs—we want lower teaching loads, fancier facilities, better paid and more
well-known faculty, etc. This is what raises our ranking and our academic reputation.” And some statis-
tical work that my colleague Matt Denhart and I have done suggests that for public schools every $1 in
higher tuition charges is associated with roughly $2 in higher salaries for full professors. In short, it is not
in the self-interest of the faculty and staff of colleges to promote tuition reduction or elimination for large
portions of the student population.
How endowments can work to make colleges more affordable is illustrated best by Berea College. Berea
is a good quality liberal arts college, ranking 75th in the national rankings of liberal arts colleges by U.S.
News & World Report. The school prides itself on promoting access to lower income persons, and 75 percent
of students are on Pell Grants, one of the highest percentages for any institution in the country. It is a col-
lege for poor kids.
Berea says on its web site:
Every Berea student is awarded a 4-year, tuition scholarship. . . . The actual cost to students and their
families is $0. . . . But a Berea education isn’t free. We have the same financial obligations that other
colleges do. The difference is our endowment. It’s a resource made available by people who believe
exceptional students shouldn’t be denied an outstanding education.22
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Berea uses its huge endowment to cover the tuition costs for all students (the tuition is nominally
$23,000), and some outside scholarship money keeps the amount that Berea spends per student below
that—but the endowment is used to cover basic educational costs (some students pay some room and
board, but traditionally all students are expected to work to cover some of these costs). Berea’s philoso-
phy is: our endowment is dedicated to making our school affordable to all rather than to make the school
more luxurious with more frills. Other wealthy schools choose not to do what Berea is doing, but it is not
because they are incapable, but rather that they are unwilling.23 Meg Whitman of eBay, for example,
recently gave a huge gift to Princeton to build Whitman College, a residential facility that will cost over
$300,000 a bed—roughly the cost of a luxury hotel of the Ritz-Carlton variety. She could have insisted
her funding go to support lower costs for student enrollees. Princeton no doubt told her “we need this
luxury facility to help lure students here that would otherwise go to Harvard or Yale.” There is nothing
wrong with Whitman making such a gift—it is a free country, although one might question whether it is
an abuse of the tax-exempt nature of university giving. If donations for student housing were not tax-
exempt, would Ms. Whitman have made such a gift to Princeton? Questions like that need pondering as
we consider revisions in federal tax policies towards universities.
Unintended Consequences of a Spending Payout Rule
If, in fact, wealthy colleges used incremental expenditures resulting from an endowment spending rule
mainly to hire more faculty, pay faculty more, add non-administrative staff, build luxury dormitories,
etc., it may well be the spending rule would have the unintended consequences of accelerating the academic
arms race. As Harvard, Princeton, and Stanford offer more amenities—smaller classes, etc.—for their stu-
dents, Harvard wannabes will feel the need to do the same. Instead of reducing the cost to students of
higher education, such a policy might ultimately increase the use of resources by society for higher edu-
cation, with dubious payoffs in terms of outcomes. Thus an endowment spending rule could become
potentially part of the problem, not the solution.
That possibility cannot be ignored. Although price competition is notoriously muted in higher edu-
cation (ever hear of a college advertising a sale on its educational services on television or the Internet?),
schools compete vigorously in other ways, including providing expensive student amenities. Higher
endowment spending at the top very well could induce the second tier of private universities and the
selective public institutions to increase non-academic spending on amenities that have little to do with
advancing instruction or the frontiers of knowledge. If you force Harvard to spend more, ultimately it
will impact even the Slippery Rock colleges of the world.
Conclusions
Universities have absorbed more of society’s resources over time. More of the national income is going
to support higher education than ever before, and wealth owned by institutions of higher learning has
grown sharply faster than the overall growth of income, wealth, and population. Thus, with the passage
of time, the fiscal consequences of favorable tax treatment of colleges and universities have grown.
Policymakers first should ask: should public subsidies to universities continue to grow, or should their
growth be curbed and possibly even reversed? I believe the underlying theoretical premises justifying mas-
sive government subsidies are flawed, given the realities of modern higher education. It is costly and becom-
ing more so over time. It is rather elitist, at least at the schools which consume the most attention and
resources. The twin goals of equal economic opportunity and economic growth are not being positively
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addressed by current high levels of subsidization and favorable tax treatment if the data I have examined
are at all relevant, as I think they are.
Even if assistance is to continue, might we alter policies to make it
more efficient? I think there is a strong case to do so. This paper is not
the place to outline a comprehensive reform plan that would increase
efficiency, improve quality, raise productivity, or achieve other objec-
tives. Rather, we are focusing on tax policy. A case can be made for the
government to impose conditions on institutions accepting tax-exempt
funds. Minimum spending requirements from endowments, for exam-
ple, are one approach. Conceptually superior alternatives to a rigid 5
percent rule are available that would alter spending requirements as
rates of return on investments change over time or between schools,
with the spending requirement varying with each school’s own invest-
ment experience. An alternative to rigid mandates, an under spending
tax, is an option. For example, if college A faces a 5.4 percent spending
requirement from its endowment but spends only 4.4 percent, a 20 per-
cent tax on the difference between 4.4 and 5.4 percent (0.2 percent of
the endowment’s value) could be imposed. Universities that insist on not spending from endowment
funds could do so if they are willing to pay taxes to compensate for lost revenues to the government from
favorable tax treatments of endowments. Similarly, subjecting non-instructional or non-research related
spending to taxation seems justified, and might even have the healthy effect of slowing down the spend-
ing on amenities that raise costs but do little for academic quality.
At the same time, those believing changing federal tax policy will fundamentally alter the problem of
rising college costs are almost certainly overstating the importance of this factor in the college cost explo-
sion. The factors that cause tuition fees to rise so much, triggering calls for greater endowment spending—
things such as heavy reliance on third party payments, the dulled incentives to enhance efficiency arising
from the non-profit nature of universities, the lack of good measurement of college outcomes, etc.—all are
matters beyond the purview of tax policy.24 Altering taxation of universities or endowments can, at best,
have a secondary impact on the college affordability problem. That does not mean, however, that the
attempt should not be made.
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